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
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Approved For Release 2004/05/12 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000900020001-6

27 November 1974

NOTE FOR: Mr. Stoertz

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1. Attached are two notes on the RISOP/SIOP question. I reported on the Marshall letter at the 27 November Morning Meeting and asked my colleagues on the Executive Committee to send me by Monday any additional names they felt ought to be included in the putative list of briefing recipients covered in Marshall's concluding paragraph. In doing so, I stressed the essentiality of keeping this list small, noting that while we might be able to add three or four names, any attempt to do much more than that would overload the circuits and perhaps queer the whole arrangement.

2. I will make my final recommendations to the DCI on the bigot list after receiving the inputs from the other deputies plus, of course, your own views. I would like to discuss this with you early next week.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachments

- 1 - Net Assessments file
- 1 - D/NIO Chrono✓



MEMORANDUM FOR: Bob

I am sending this to you so that you will know the background on this fairly complicated issue should it come up while you are acting for me when I am absent.

George A. Carver, Jr.

Attachments

27 Nov 74
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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NIO # 2557-74

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Kha

16 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Agency Participation in Preparation of the Red Integrated Strategic Operations Plan (RISOP)

1. On 14 November 1974, Dr. Andrew Marshall (Director, Net Assessment, Department of Defense) called me to continue our discussion of DCI and Agency participation in the RISOP exercise. (His call was a result of a discussion I had initiated with the Secretary of Defense, who had asked Dr. Marshall to look into the issues involved and see what could be done.) Dr. Marshall said he had reviewed the matter with the Joint Staff and Chairman of the JCS (and though he did not say so, I am sure he had also touched base again with the Secretary). On the basis of those conversations, he offered the following two proposals:

(a) That the DCI and a small handful of senior officers (with emphasis on both adjectives) be briefed twice a year on the results of the semi-annual war game, playing the RISOP against the actual US Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP). This briefing would be the same one received by the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

(b) Although it was not felt appropriate for non-DOD officials (read CIA officers) to participate in the actual development of the RISOP or play on the Red team in this twice-yearly gaming exercise, some procedure should be devised whereby a small number of knowledgeable Agency officers could critique the "Red inputs," i.e., the Soviet strategic doctrine and perceptions which shape the RISOP.

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2. I told Dr. Marshall this was satisfactory (but did not comment that it was more than I expected to get). He promised to follow up our conversation with a written note confirming the commitments we had made.

3. He called back on 15 November and asked what senior assistants the DCI might want to receive the gaming briefs. I said I could not give him a definitive list off the top of my head but the list would include people such as the DDCI, the DDS&T, the NIOs for USSR/East Europe and for Strategic Programs, myself, the DDI, and perhaps one or two others. Marshall said a group of that nature could be entirely acceptable.

4. I mentioned the Marshall call and arrangements he proposed at the Executive Committee meeting on 15 November. The DCI endorsed these arrangements.


George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

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O/D/DCI/NIO:GACarver/mee 18Nov74

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- 1 - DCI
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

26 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: List

SUBJECT : Revised Draft Strategy Report for FY 1975
Key Intelligence Question 69

Attached for your information is subject Strategy Report for KIQ 69. This version is still viewed as a working draft which will be subjected to further review in the USIB forum. Per our discussion, I have added a Part III which I believe reflects the comments made by the members of the working group at our meeting. If you have any suggestions on Part III, please let me know as soon as possible.



Executive Assistant
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

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18 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Imprinted Stationery

REFERENCE : DD/A 74-4133, Memo to Multiple Addressees
from DD/A, Same Subject, dated 21 October 1974

1. The NIOs welcome your memorandum on imprinted stationery -- a subject which had been under debate for a number of months with your predecessor. We would, however, like to make several points regarding your proposal as it pertains to the Director of Central Intelligence's stationery and to that of his two Community staffs -- the NIO and ICS.

2. Tab A appears to be a reasonable exemplar of stationery when the Director is serving as the Executive Head of the Central Intelligence Agency. There are, however, many occasions when the Director of Central Intelligence transmits correspondence of a Community nature while wearing his Community hat. Thus, it is suggested that another exemplar be prepared for this type of correspondence, i.e., The Director of Central Intelligence - Office of the Director.


3. As noted in paragraph 4 of your memorandum and covered in earlier correspondence and discussions, there is a vital need to disassociate the NIOs and ICS from the Central Intelligence Agency since they support the Director of Central Intelligence and not the Agency per se. For this reason, it is suggested that the NIOs and ICS letterhead be similar to your Tab B exemplar but with The Director of Central Intelligence, rather than the Central Intelligence Agency (see attached), i.e., identical to the DCI letterhead with the NIOs or ICS overprint.

~~Administrative - Internal Use Only~~

4. Of course, the above limitations also pertain to the Tab C informal stationery -- Central Intelligence Agency or the Agency seal would not be appropriate for the NIOs or ICS. Attached for your consideration is an exemplar of informal stationery which has been used by the NIOs since their inception. (Plates are available in PSD.) This format would be acceptable to the NIOs as would any stationery which reflects its role as a Community staff and not part of the Central Intelligence Agency.

5. I would be happy to discuss this further at your convenience.



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 (for)
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachments

cc: Executive Secretariat
AO/DCI

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O/D/DCI/NIO  mee
Orig - Addressee w/att
1@ - cc's w/att
1 - GACarver Chrono w/atts ✓
1 -  Chrono w/atts
1 - NIO/RI w/o atts

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

18 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Lew Allen, Jr., USAF
Director
National Security Agency

SUBJECT : Warsaw Pact Theater Forces

25X1 1. Ever since the DCI gave me my present responsibilities, I have been concerned about the complex problems inherent in the Community's discharge of its continuing responsibility for maintaining a valid, current assessment of the size, strength and capabilities of the Warsaw Pact's theater forces -- an intelligence conundrum about which you know considerably more than I. Last summer, when [redacted] of OSR announced his decision to retire, I took advantage of his dedication and good nature to ask if he would be willing to take a thorough, thoughtful look at this range of problems once he was unchained from an in-box and the pressures of deadlines or flaps. No one has been more immersed in these questions than he, or done more to shed light on them. I asked him -- at his own pace and in his own way -- to take a hard look at this conundrum and its associated issues, to draw on the totality of his background and experience, and then to set down his views, conclusions, and suggestions candidly and in some detail.

2. Attached for your personal information and consideration are two copies of the results of [redacted] work, an essay entitled "Beans and Bean Counters." It is a document I commend to you as well worth reading.

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In it, [] makes a number of suggestions about changes that might be made in various aspects of the Community's address to this problem which, in his opinion, would make that address more effective and efficient. Given the near real time systems just over the horizon, the necessity for putting ourselves in the best possible posture before we are inundated in a flood of new data is self evident.

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3. [] suggestions have the merit of being well thought out and coherent. I would not necessarily advocate their adoption in their entirety but believe they can be extremely useful as a stimulus (or even provocation) to the ideas of others. By working together under this stimulus, the Community may be able to come up with an even better package.

4. I would like to get in touch with you after I return from Europe to get your reactions to [] treatment of this problem and his recommendations. At this stage, this is a very informal exercise and should be kept as such. I am not broadcasting this study throughout the Community and believe it is too early to do so. I have sent it on a personal basis in a similar note to Danny Graham, Sam Wilson, John Hicks of NPIC and Hank Knoche of OSR.

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[]

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George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachments

GACarver, Jr./mee

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

Originals with same text to addressees as noted in para 4, above

- 1 - DCI
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- 1 - DDI
- 1 - Executive Registry
- ✓ 1 - D/NIO Chrono
- 1 - Registry
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<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION
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<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE

Remarks:

SUBJECT: The [redacted] Paper

I have sent copies of the [redacted] paper (the expurgated version) to Danny Graham, Lew Allen, Sam Wilson, John Hicks and Hank Knoche. In each case, the study was sent in a personal note employing the attached text.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
George A. Carver, Jr., D/DCI/NIO	18Nov74

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NIO # 2558-24

16 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Samuel V. Wilson, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT : NSDM 242

1. I am sorry I have had such trouble getting together with your colleague [REDACTED] but the past two weeks have been unusually hectic. With regard to his memorandum of 5 November (TS 206428-74) I believe the IC Staff's initial suggestion is a right one to follow and do not endorse Mr. Lehman's alternate.

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2. I think that the Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Officers (whoever he or she may be) is the officer who should serve as the DCI's representative on the interagency support group. I have no problems with the head of the Office of Current Intelligence functioning as the deputy although, if he does, it should be clearly understood and spelled out in his instructions that he is representing the DCI in the latter's capacity as head of the Intelligence Community and is not appearing as the head of one subordinate component (OCI) of a single member of that Community.

3. With respect to Mr. Lehman's suggestion, though I agree that the potential for a nuclear crisis is most likely to fall within [REDACTED] area of responsibility, general principles should not be keyed to specific cases. In any event, I would obviously co-opt the NIO or NIOs involved in the areas of concern in any actual crisis situation which required a convening of the ISG to support the WSAG and the President during such a crisis.

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[REDACTED]
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

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SUBJECT: NSDM 242, dated 16 November 1974

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Distribution

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1 - NSDM 242 file

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NIO # 2557-74

16 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Agency Participation in Preparation of the Red
Integrated Strategic Operations Plan (RISOP)

1. On 14 November 1974, Dr. Andrew Marshall (Director, Net Assessment, Department of Defense) called me to continue our discussion of DCI and Agency participation in the RISOP exercise. (His call was a result of a discussion I had initiated with the Secretary of Defense, who had asked Dr. Marshall to look into the issues involved and see what could be done.) Dr. Marshall said he had reviewed the matter with the Joint Staff and Chairman of the JCS (and though he did not say so, I am sure he had also touched base again with the Secretary). On the basis of those conversations, he offered the following two proposals:

(a) That the DCI and a small handful of senior officers (with emphasis on both adjectives) be briefed twice a year on the results of the semi-annual war game, playing the RISOP against the actual US Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP). This briefing would be the same one received by the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

(b) Although it was not felt appropriate for non-DOD officials (read CIA officers) to participate in the actual development of the RISOP or play on the Red team in this twice-yearly gaming exercise, some procedure should be devised whereby a small number of knowledgeable Agency officers could critique the "Red inputs," i.e., the Soviet strategic doctrine and perceptions which shape the RISOP.

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
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2. I told Dr. Marshall this was satisfactory (but did not comment that it was more than I expected to get). He promised to follow up our conversation with a written note confirming the commitments we had made.

3. He called back on 15 November and asked what senior assistants the DCI might want to receive the gaming briefs. I said I could not give him a definitive list off the top of my head but the list would include people such as the DDCI, the DDS&T, the NIOs for USSR/East Europe and for Strategic Programs, myself, the DDI, and perhaps one or two others. Marshall said a group of that nature could be entirely acceptable.

4. I mentioned the Marshall call and arrangements he proposed at the Executive Committee meeting on 15 November. The DCI endorsed these arrangements.



/s/ George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

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16 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : FY 1975 KIQ Strategy Reports


1. As you know, there are 69 Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1975. Attached are draft Strategy Reports for 61 of those questions. The status of the remaining eight is as follows:

a. NIO/SP is still working on four (for KIQs 7, 8, 12 and 13). The enormous task of 11-3/8-74 slowed the strategic fraternity down for understandable reasons.

b. The three China KIQs (31, 32 and 33) are in abeyance. We will either have to get someone to serve as NIO in the very near future or make some form of alternate arrangements on this account.

c. [] is still working on KIQ 69 (the complex one on the likelihood of oil-rich nations using their new wealth to fund political action and subversion). I asked him to take this on along with KIQ 68 on terrorism, since it cuts across so many accounts and all of the other NIOs were busy in their own parishes. (The Strategy Report for 68 is included in the attached package.)

2. These draft Strategy Reports have been sent to component heads in the USIB member agencies as they have been completed for their information, so that the line managers may get some indication of the total resource sums of the commitment checks their representatives have signed in the various working groups addressing these KIQs on an individual basis.



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
3. Save for the three China KIQs, the ones outstanding should be in hand by COB next Friday, though it will require an additional day or so to edit and reproduce them in a form analogous to the ones here included.

4. You can start taking the KIQs up before USIB as soon as you want to after that, though there are several considerations you should weigh and will have to decide. One is whether you want USIB to address these drafts or whether you personally would like some changes made in them before they are formally submitted for comment and concurrence by USIB principals. Also, they could be taken up at USIB in one single package or addressed serially in logically grouped packages of, say, ten or twenty. The former procedure would produce a very long session but if you want to inhibit too much discussion and carping, might be preferable. The latter would give honorable members more time to address and focus on specific Strategy Reports -- something you may or may not want them to have.


George A. Carver, Jr.

Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment


Copy No. 1

O/D/DCI/NIO:GACarver/mee

Distribution

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NIO # 2547-74 D/NIO

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15 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : NIO/SA's Status Report

1. Attached is Dave Murphy's 12 November status report outlining his activities since 10 September and his development concepts of how the NIO/SA should function and the areas on which he feels he should concentrate his efforts.

2. To my eye, Dave is going about his task in exactly the right way: first surveying who is currently doing what in the three broad areas of collection, analysis and production; then beginning to perceive specific areas where there are gaps or imperfect meshes in the Community's present efforts on which his time and attention would be productively focused on your behalf.

3. One such area is the field of emplaced sensors, where there are now some problems which I think Dave could help solve. Another is the range of complex issues associated with deriving the maximum feasible intelligence yield from the wave of Soviet emigres who will be leaving the USSR, primarily for Israel, as a result of pressures engendered by, among others, Senator Jackson. This gets very tricky because of the complicated equities involved and the strong feelings this subject engenders in many quarters. It badly needs a broad-gauged, continuing overview conducted on your behalf (in close consultation with others such as and Howard Stoertz). I have asked Dave to take on this charge and he readily agreed.

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
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4. After you have had a chance to glance through his memorandum, he would welcome an opportunity to talk directly with you to see if you share my feeling that he is heading in the right general directions.



George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

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Attachment

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

14 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: List

SUBJECT : Draft Strategy Reports for FY 75
Key Intelligence Questions

REFERENCE : EA/NIO Memoranda dated 11 and
25 October 1974, Same Subject

1. Forwarded for your information are an additional
20 draft Strategy Reports for the FY 75 Key Intelligence
Questions.

2. The few remaining reports will be made available
to you as they reach the same level of working level
coordination as the attached.

Executive Assistant
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

14 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Leon F. Schwartz
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : Draft Strategy Reports for FY 75
Key Intelligence Questions

REFERENCE : EA/NIO Memoranda dated 11 and
25 October 1974, Same Subject

1. Forwarded for your information are an additional 17 draft Strategy Reports for the FY 75 Key Intelligence Questions. Another 12 draft reports have been excluded from this package due to their very sensitive security classification. Copies of these may, however, be reviewed by you at the USIB Secretariat, Room 7C25, CIA Headquarters Building, if you so desire.

2. The few remaining reports will be made available to you as they reach the same level of working level coordination as the attached.

Executive Assistant

Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

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TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: Attached is a package sent to the DCI on the proposed agenda for the 5-6 December PFIAB meeting. I would like to discuss it at our Thursday session (14 November). You two gentlemen will be the ones primarily involved but our other colleagues will also have some interest in this matter.			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
George A. Carver, Jr.			12 Nov 74
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
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FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions

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(11/8/74)

DRAFT AGENDA

THURSDAY, 5 DECEMBER 1974

There are two subjects on today's agenda:

- o the Middle East
- o meeting with Secretary Simon

The luncheon guest will be: Mr. Donald Rumsfeld/
Secretary Schlesinger

The greater part of the day will be devoted to an assessment of our intelligence capabilities to support U. S. policy in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. For this purpose we plan to devote the morning to a review of the major military, political and economic forces at work in these areas. We will spend the afternoon discussing intelligence requirements and intelligence resources directed at the Middle East.

9:00-9:30	Reading time
9:30-10:00	Chairman's time
10:00-12:00	The current situation in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf; <ul style="list-style-type: none">o military capabilities of Arab, Iranian, Israeli and Soviet forceso political realities and intentionso economic factors
12:15-1:45	Luncheon at the Metropolitan Club/FDIC Guest: Mr. Donald Rumsfeld/Secretary Schlesinger
2:00-4:00	Intelligence requirements capabilities and limitations in the Middle East <ul style="list-style-type: none">o review of the intelligence requirementso intelligence significance of foreign baseso allied intelligence contributionso intelligence deficiencies: for meeting current requirements; for meeting requirements anticipated in the event of hostilities (strategic/tactical)

4:00-5:00 Mr. William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury
[Note: Following his reading of the transcript of Mr. Cherne's remarks on economic intelligence at the October meeting, Secy Simon requested an opportunity to meet with the full Board prior to any meeting the Board might have with the President. Secy Simon does not agree with some aspects of the report and is anxious to discuss his reservations.]

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1974

9:00-9:30 Reading time
9:30-10:30 Update on Special Projects
11:15-12:30 Meeting with the DCI
12:45 Lunch at the Department of State. Guests of Secretary Kissinger.

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0 # 2505-74

12 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI
DDS&T
DDA
D/DCI/IC
General Counsel
Legislative Counsel

SUBJECT : General Graham's 26 September Request
for Declassification Action and the
Issues It Raises

1. On 26 September, General Graham wrote the DCI requesting USIB review of certain portions of the Secretary of Defense's Posture Statements for FY's 1963-1973 for declassification as requested by Mr. Morton Halperin.

2. Because of the extensive amount of material that had to be examined carefully before a response could be made to such a request, I asked [redacted] to come briefly out of retirement in a consultant capacity and take on this task. He has now done so and has offered two recommendations:

a. A draft memorandum for the DCI to send to General Graham replying to the latter's 26 September request.

b. A separate memorandum which he recommends be circulated to the USIB (along with copies of the DCI's response) for early discussion of the issues involved.



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25X1 3. [] recommendations are thoughtful
and well considered. They have been checked with Mr.
25X1 [] USIB's Executive Secretary; [] Chairman
25X1 of the USIB Security Committee; [] of the
General Counsel's office; [] of the DDA's
Classification Programs Branch; Mr. Knoche, Director of
OSR, and Mr. Stoertz, the NIO for Strategic Programs.

25X1 4. You will note that [] proposal has
the Director responding to General Graham as DCI rather
than as Chairman of the USIB, even though the request
was addressed to him in his latter capacity. This
reflects the point made by several people, including
25X1 [] that it is as DCI that he submits NIE's and
is vested with a statutory responsibility for protecting
sensitive sources and methods.

25X1 5. [] has done an excellent piece of work
and I find his recommendations persuasive. Since our
actions in this particular case will doubtless set a
precedent we will have to live with, however, I want to
be sure that each recipient of this memorandum has a
chance to voice his opinions before any proposal is
offered to the DCI for his approval or reply for his
signature. Since we need to answer General Graham before
he begins getting static from Mr. Halperin, it would
be helpful if we could have your views by Friday,
15 November.

[]
George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachments

O/D/DCI/NIO:GACarver/mee
Distribution

- 25X1 1@ - Addressees w/atts ✓
1 - D/NIO Chrono w/atts
1 - VOC Soft file on Declassification w/atts
1 - [] FYI w/atts
1 - NIO/RI w/o atts

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DCI Letterhead

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Daniel A. Graham, USA
Director
Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Your Request for Declassification Action,
dated 26 September 1974

I have carefully studied your request for a determination as to whether certain portions of the Secretary of Defense's Posture Statements for FYs 1963-1973, dealing with the strategic threat from the USSR and China, can be declassified and released, as requested by Morton H. Halperin. My basic conclusions are as follows:

1. There would be strong basis for objection if the request were for declassification of the actual estimates on which these passages were based -- i.e., the annual NIEs on Soviet and Chinese strategic military forces -- particularly within ten years of publication. In my view, these NIEs, because of the critical importance of their subject matter, their comprehensiveness, the all-source basis on which they are constructed and their detailed discussion of intelligence methods, have a sensitivity far transcending that of most other intelligence documents.

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2. On the other hand, the Secretary of Defense's annual Posture Statements are policy documents which draw only selectively on the NIEs and in fact are routinely subjected to sanitization and declassification for publication in the transcripts of the hearings in which they were presented. Thus, the question becomes one of whether further declassification would be appropriate.

3. From the standpoint of protecting sensitive USIB sources and methods, I can see no objection to declassification and release, for the years given, of one major category of material which has been routinely deleted from the unclassified versions of the Posture Statements -- the assessments of the growth and potential ultimate size of major Soviet strategic force components -- i.e., ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. Despite their undoubted sensitivity at the time they were issued, these estimates are now of only historical significance; except for one table -- drawn from the

25X1 [redacted] rather than the NIEs -- none of the projections
goes past mid-1973. [redacted]

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little basis for judging our present abilities to assess Soviet force developments. I also can see no objection to the declassification of the comparable discussion of Chinese force levels.

4. With respect to the descriptive material on Soviet and Chinese strategic forces in the Posture Statements, the Statements for FYs 1971-73 have already been extensively declassified, reflecting an increased recent willingness to acknowledge U.S. ability to collect important kinds of information by national technical means. In my view, the Department of Defense would be justified in asserting that little if any further declassification could be made of these Statements without jeopardizing the results if not the existence of sensitive intelligence sources and methods. On the other hand, I can see no objection to the Department of Defense's declassifying much of the previously withheld descriptive material in earlier Posture Statements, using the same standards and procedures used to protect sensitive sources and methods with more recent Posture Statements.

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5. Accordingly, I have no objection to the declassification and release of the Posture Statements in question along the lines outlined above.

6. Under the circumstances, I see no need for formal USIB review of the documents in question. However, your request does call attention to some fundamental issues that USIB members should be thinking about. Accordingly, I propose to circulate this memorandum, and an attached staff memorandum, for USIB discussion at an early date.

W. E. Colby
~~Director~~

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D R A F T

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Request for Declassification Action

The Problem

1. By memorandum of 26 September, General Graham has requested USIB review of a request by Morton H. Halperin for declassification and release of those portions of the Secretary of Defense's annual Posture Statements to Congress for Fiscal Years 1963-1973 which deal with the strategic threat from the USSR and China. Mr. Halperin's request was evidently prompted by an invitation from the magazine Foreign Policy to reply to an article by Albert Wohlstetter ("Is There a Strategic Arms Race?") which appeared in its Summer 1974 issue. The basic thesis of Mr. Wohlstetter's article is that the U.S. has systematically underestimated the growth and ultimate size of the Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces and has persistently understated the future strength of the strategic bomber force by postulating a phasing out of older models which never materialized. This conclusion is derived from a series of

30 charts evaluating 51 long-range "predictions" of ICBM, SLBM and bomber strength which appeared in the Secretary of Defense's Posture Statements for FY 1963-1972 inclusive. These charts, prepared at a SECRET level, were downgraded to unclassified by the Department of Defense for Mr. Wohlstetter's use.

2. All but the FY 1963 Posture Statement draw clearly and explicitly on the then current strategic military National Intelligence Estimates, with particular reference to the Intelligence Community's judgments at the time of the existing and prospective size of major Soviet strategic force components. Thus the request by Mr. Halperin, now research director of the Twentieth Century Fund's study on national security, raises some fundamental questions as to how we handle our responsibilities under the Freedom of Information Act -- questions that are bound to recur as time goes on. Although the government is not now legally bound to consider requests for declassification of those Posture Statements less than ten years old, Mr. Halperin will almost certainly argue that he is entitled to the same access as Mr. Wohlstetter and that the information he wants can be released without damage to legitimate security requirements. Indeed, he has specifically called attention, in a brief note in the

Fall issue of Foreign Policy, to his request for release of the Posture Statements cited by Mr. Wohlstetter. Failure to deal responsibly and defensibly with his request could lead to court action and increased Congressional pressures for speedier declassification procedures. And in any event, some of our older publications are already subject to requests for declassification.

General Findings

3. As a general proposition, the annual strategic military NIEs themselves should probably continue to be regarded as representing a special order of sensitivity, because of their comprehensiveness and virtually unparalleled status as all-source documents. They are typically bulky publications designed to provide the President and his advisors with all relevant details on how our critical intelligence judgments were derived. Thus their special quality reflects not only the sensitivity of the individual items of intelligence contained in them but their breadth and depth of coverage.

4. For practical purposes of supporting the policy-makers, to be sure, we have in the past published

sanitized TOP SECRET versions of many of these estimates, and we allow material derived from them, suitably sanitized, to appear in SECRET and even unclassified versions of documents like the Secretary of Defense's Posture Statements. But the NIEs themselves should not be considered subject to declassification until they no longer provide a good basis for assessing the Intelligence Community's present and future overall capabilities and limitations in the strategic intelligence field. After ten years, good grounds perhaps might be found for declassification on a case-by-case basis. Over shorter periods the older estimate would more and more resemble the current version.

5. The Posture Statements, however, are policy documents which draw selectively from the estimates and are thus more open to item-by-item declassification action. In varying degree, they have already been routinely sanitized and downgraded from SECRET for publication in the unclassified transcript of the Congressional hearings at which they were presented. Indeed, beginning with Secretary Laird's FY 1971 Posture Statement, the unclassified version of which includes a 21-page annex on the "size and character

of the threat," the bulk of the classified texts have been released, reflecting greatly increased willingness to acknowledge the ability of national technical collection systems [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and the like. Some deployment numbers have been rounded and simplified, and a number of other details have properly been omitted to protect the results if not the existence of [REDACTED]

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procedures. In these later Posture Statements, however, the only major omissions have been the discussions of future force levels. This is of particular relevance with the FY 1971 presentation, the classified version of which contains a table showing explicitly how earlier projections of Soviet ICBM and SLBM strength had had to be revised upward as new deployment data became available.

6. Mr. Halperin's request thus poses three questions:

- How sensitive, from the point of view of protecting intelligence sources and methods, are the estimates of possible future force levels which Mr. Halperin is presumably most interested in obtaining?

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- What basis, if any, is there for further declassifying the descriptive material in the later (FY 1971-1973) Posture Statements?
- What problems, if any, would be created by attempting to declassify the descriptive material in earlier Posture Statements, using the standards applied with the FY 1971 statement and subsequently to protect sensitive data?

Specific Findings

7. A review of the classified discussions of the current and future Soviet force levels contained in the Posture Statements provides no persuasive basis for objecting to their declassification and release. This is true despite their undoubted sensitivity at the time of their initial presentation, their revelation of differences within the Intelligence Community (as in the evidence of dissenting Army and Air Force views in the FY 1964 Statement), their failure at various times to fully anticipate what actually developed, and the possible inclusion of some minor errors of observation in describing the status of strategic

25X1 deployments at the times the estimates of future force growth were made. The Soviets are well aware of our ability to monitor the buildup of their strategic forces, and any additional insight they might derive from these documents about how close to the mark we were in the period up through early 1972 are likely to be of only historical interest. The "predictions" of future force levels, both in the early years and in the later period in which alternative projections were constructed, ultimately reflect the subjective judgments of analysts and their superiors about which was almost universally acknowledged to be a highly uncertain future. The only projections in the Posture Statements in question which go past mid-1973 are those in a table used in the FY 1972 Statement -- presented in March 1971, well over a year before the SALT Interim Agreement limits came into effect -- which projects ICBM, SLBM and heavy bomber figures for mid-1972, mid-1974 and mid-1976.

8. From the standpoint of protection of the security of USIB materials, there would appear to be

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no basis for objection to the Department of Defense's declassifying the descriptive material in the pre-FY 1971 Posture Statements, using the same standards and procedures it employed in sanitizing the FY 1971 and later Posture Statements to protect sensitive sources and methods -- even though such declassification would presumably confirm the existence of some historical uncertainties in the Intelligence Community on such subjects as the mission of the Tallinn system.

9. The Department of Defense would appear to be justified if it were to refuse further declassification of the FY 1971-1973 Posture Statements except for the release of the analytical chart on ICBM and SLBM projections contained in the appendix to the FY 1971 Statement. Although the continuing validity of a few deletions might now be questioned, the bulk of them appear to be fully justified.



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D R A F T

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UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	D/DCI/NIO		
2	DCI		
3	Executive Secretary, USIB		
4			
5			
6			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks: Attached are a request for declassification action by General Graham and a proposed reply for the Director's signature. In signing the proposed memorandum, the Director would be approving (a) a specific response to General Graham's request and (b) circulation of the memo and its attachment to USIB members for discussion at an early date.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE

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UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

1 November 1974

NOTE FOR: George Carver

STAT 1. Attached is a proposed package for the Director, reflecting comments and suggestions by Howie Stoertz, [redacted] (Security Committee), [redacted] (Office of the General Counsel), [redacted] (DDA Classification Programs Branch) and [redacted] OSR, which is responsible for drafting the kind of material in question, also concurs:

2. Briefly, the Director is asked to sign a memo to Danny Graham which:

a. Provides specific guidance to Graham in responseto the latter's request. (Paras 1-4)

b. Calls for circulation of the memo and its attachment to USIB for discussion of the issues involved at an early date

3. You will note that the proposal is for the Director to respond to Graham as DCI rather than as Chairman of USIB even though the request came to him in his latter capacity. This reflects the point made by various people, including [redacted] that it is as DCI that he submits NIEs and has statutory responsibility for protecting sensitive sources and methods.

[redacted]

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
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Visit to HDQS of the Director for Intelligence,
International Military Staff, NATO

FROM: DDI
EXTENSION NO.
DATE 11 November 1974

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. Mr. George Carver Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Officers				
2. Room 7E62 Hdqs				
3.				
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4 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
SUBJECT : The RISOP Question


1. My 22 October session with the Secretary of Defense was largely devoted to the issues involved in costing Soviet defense expenditures. After the main session ended and the economists had left the room, however, I quietly brought up the RISOP matter (per your request), explaining that you were still getting some pressure on this topic from the PFIAB, particularly its Chairman. Schlesinger turned to Andy Marshall and asked him to pursue this question with me.

2. On 25 October, Andy Marshall came to my office in compliance with Jim Schlesinger's instructions. Also participating in that session were Howard Stoertz and [redacted] (acting for [redacted] who was on leave). I briefly sketched the relevant background, touching on your discussions with the PFIAB last spring and the correspondence generated by Admiral Anderson as a result of the problems he and some of his Board members had with what they (erroneously) thought was the intent of the sentence in last year's NIE 11-8 which said the Intelligence Community did not foresee the Soviets developing a true first-strike capability within the next decade. After explaining the background, including my two brief discussions with the Secretary and one conversation with General Dougherty (the Commander of SAC), and stressing that you had no desire or intent to trespass on the Secretary of Defense's turf, I made two suggestions to get the conversation rolling:

- (a) That arrangements be made for you and a small number of your most senior subordinates directly involved with this problem to be briefed on the results of the SIOP/RISOP gaming done every six months by (alternately) SAGA and the JSTPS.

(b) That appropriate steps be taken for knowledgeable persons representing you in your capacity as DCI to contribute to the judgments on Soviet perceptions, intentions and objectives which are folded into this gaming process.

3. Marshall listened attentively and courteously. He appeared to accept our assurances that neither you nor any of your representatives had any desire to involve themselves in U.S. strategic planning (e.g., the SIOP) and also to accept our proposition that Soviet perceptions, intentions and objectives were not solely departmental concerns of the Secretary of Defense but also national intelligence questions for which you bore a measure of responsibility. Marshall promised to look into this problem further and be back in touch. He had no apparent conceptual trouble with either of the specific recommendations I advanced for consideration but (naturally) made no promises or commitments at this session.



George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

cc: DDCI
DDS&T
DDI
NIO/SP
NIO/USSR
Executive Registry

GACarver, Jr./mee
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1 - RI
1 - SP Soft File (D/NIO)

SECRET

NO # 2419-74

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1 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : Summary of [redacted] Recommendations

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1. On 29 October I sent you the final part of a long memorandum prepared at my request by [redacted] [redacted] This memorandum, entitled "Beans and Bean Counters", surveys the problems involved in discharging the Intelligence Community's responsibility for maintaining a valid, current assessment of the size, strength and capabilities of the Warsaw Pact's Theater Forces. That memorandum's final section contains [redacted] overall conclusions and recommendations. These were discussed at a meeting on 31 October attended by the NIO for Conventional Forces, his Assistant and [redacted] of OSR who reflected Mr. Knoche's views. To my surprise, [redacted] rather sweeping recommendations were not disputed at this meeting but, instead, largely endorsed as essential.

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2. Attached is a two-page summary of [redacted] conclusions. I strongly recommend that you read their full exposition set forth in the paper sent to you on 29 October.

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[redacted]
George A. Carver, Jr.

Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

cc: DDCI
D/DCI/IC
DDI
D/OSR
DD/S&T
Executive Registry

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Distribution:

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1 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: All NIOs and PP

SUBJECT : Foreign Service Reporting

1. Attached is a State Department airgram (largely stimulated by the DCI) sent to all diplomatic posts to remind ambassadors, embassies and consulates of the responsibilities of the Foreign Service for contributing to the national intelligence effort. The airgram also outlines a procedure intended to improve the reciprocal feedback between Foreign Service reporters and consumers engaged in national intelligence production.

2. As you will note from his buckslip, the DCI would like a reading in mid-January on how this system is working. I shall caucus with you at that time before commenting to him. I would appreciate your sending short notes to [redacted] (who can keep a central book) whenever particularly useful Foreign Service reports catch your eye or whenever you note particular information gaps which in your opinion could easily have been covered by Foreign Service reports which either were not done or were not properly circulated.

[redacted]

George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

GACarver, Jr/ks

Distribution:

Original - Dave is Holding
11 - Copies as Indicated to NIOs and PP
1 - GAC Chrono

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